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Abstract
Bayesian approaches to data analysis and machine learning are widespread and popular as they
provide intuitive yet rigorous axioms for learning from data; see Bernardo & Smith (2004) and
Bishop (2006). However, this rigour comes with a caveat, that the Bayesian model is a precise
reflection of Nature. There has been a recent trend to address potential model misspecification by
raising the likelihood function to a power, primarily for robustness reasons, though not exclusively.
In this paper we provide a coherent specification of the power parameter once the Bayesian model
has been specified in the absence of a perfect model.
1 Introduction
Bayesian inference is one of the most important scientific learning paradigms in use today. Its core prin-
ciple is the use of probability to quantify all aspects of uncertainty in a statistical model, and then given
data x, use conditional probability to update uncertainty via Bayes theorem, p(θ|x) ∝ f(x; θ) p(θ),
where θ denotes the parameters of the model, p(θ|x) the posterior update, f(x; θ) is the data model,
and p(θ) is the prior on the model parameters. Bayesian updating is coherent, see for example (Lindley,
2000).
The justification for Bayesian updating proceeds on an assumption that the form of the data model,
f(x; θ), is correct up to the unknown parameter value θ. Bayesian learning is optimal, see Zellner
(1988), which means that posterior uncertainty is the appropriate reflection of prior uncertainty and the
information provided by the data. However, this is only in the case when the model is true. This is at
odds with the scientific desire for keeping models simple in order to focus on the essential aspects of the
system under investigation.
Recently a number of papers have appeared seeking to address the mismatch and allow for Bayesian
learning under model misspecification; the key reason is robustness, and the idea is to raise the likelihood
to a power. See, for example, Royall & Tsou (2003), Zhang (2006a), Zhang (2006b), Jiang & Tanner
(2008), Bissiri, Holmes & Walker (2016), Walker & Hjort (2001), Watson & Holmes (2016), Miller &
Dunson (2015), Gru¨nwald & van Ommen (2014), Syring & Martin (2015), and more generally Hansen
& Sargent (2008). The paper by Bissiri, Holmes & Walker (2016), in particular, provides a formal
motivation using a coherency principle for raising the likelihood to a power.
For the formal Bayesian analyst, if f(x; θ) is misspecified, then there is no connection between any
θ and any observation from this model, and as a consequence no meaningful prior can be set. In this
case, it is argued in Bissiri, Holmes & Walker (2016) that it is preferable to look at − log f(x; θ) as
simply a loss function linking θ and observation x. Then a formal general-Bayesian update of prior p(θ)
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to posterior p(θ|x) exists and for the update to remain coherent it was shown that it must be of the form,
pw(θ|x) ∝ f(x; θ)w p(θ),
log pw(θ|x) = w log f(x; θ) + log p(θ) + logZw
where Zw is the normalising constant ensuring that the posterior distribution integrates to 1, and w is a
weighting parameter calibrating the two loss functions for θ, namely − log p(θ) and − log f(x; θ) . In
this way, w > 0 controls the learning rate of the generalised-Bayesian update, with w = 1 returning the
conventional Bayesian solution. Clearly for w < 1 the update gives less weight to the data relative to
the prior compared to the Bayesian model, resulting in a posterior that is more diffuse, and with w > 1
the data is given more prominence.
The crucial question then becomes how to set w in a formal manner. One needs to be careful as
learning about w can both be overdone (w set too high and the posterior uncertainty is underestimated)
and under done (w set too low and the posterior uncertainty is overestimated). The elegant and attractive
nature of Bayesian inference when the model precisely matches Nature is that the learning is achieved
optimally; i.e at the correct speed. See Lindley (2000), Bernardo & Smith (2004) and Zellner (1988).
In this paper we propose to setw once a proper p(θ) and model f(x; θ) have been set by matching the
prior expected gain in information between prior and posterior from two potential experiments; for Ex-
periment 1 using pw(θ|x) we compute an expected information gain between pw(·|x) and p(·), denoted
by Iw(x), to be specified later. For Experiment 2 we consider the corresponding gain in information
between posterior p(θ|x) and p(θ), which will be I1(x). Then we set w so that∫
Iw(x) f0(x) dx =
∫
I1(x) f(x; θ0) dx, (1)
where f0(x) is the true, unknown, density and θ0 is the true parameter value if the parametric model
is correct or else is the parameter value minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the true
model and the parametric family of densities. So, if the model is correct, then f0(x) = f(x; θ0) and
w will automatically be 1. The rationale for (1) is coherence; that the expected gain in information for
learning about θ0 from a single sample for both experiments is the same. To elaborate: Experiment 1
is assuming the data is not necessarily coming from the parametric model, the likelihood is f(x; θ)w
with prior p(θ) and x ∈ f0(x). According to Bissiri, Holmes & Walker (2016), the pw(θ|x) is a valid
update for learning about the θ which minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between f0(x) and
f(x; θ); i.e. θ0, and for w > 0 the posterior pw(·|x) will be consistent for θ0 for regular models. That
this is being learnt about follows from Berk (1966). Experiment 2 is assuming the data is coming from
the parametric model, the likelihood is f(x; θ) with prior p(θ) and x ∈ f(x; θ0). Both experiments are
involved with learning about the same θ0. We argue that the experimenter should be a priori indifferent
between these two experiments with respect to the prior expected gain in information about θ0. Thus,
w is set so the prior expected gain in information is the same as that which would have been obtained if
the parametric model were correct.
We can evaluate both sides of (1) using the observed data, {x1, . . . , xn}, so the left side and right
side of (1) are evaluated as
n−1
n∑
i=1
Iw(Xi) and
∫
I1(x) f(x; θ̂) dx,
respectively, where θ̂ is the maximum likelihood estimator. See White (1982) about the theory for θ̂
being the appropriate estimator for θ0. In the next section we define Iw(x) and in section 3 we present
some illustrations.
2 The prior expected information in an experiment
To quantify the prior expected information of an experiment we utilise the well established notion of
Fisher information; see Lehmann & Casella (1998). In particular we shall consider the expected diver-
2
gence in Fisher information, F (p1, p2), between two density functions p1 and p2, with exact form given
below; see for example Otto & Villani (2000). Motivation for this choice is given in the Appendix.
The Fisher relative information divergence of a posterior update from its prior, with likelihood
f(x; θ), is given by
F
{
p(·), p(·|x)} = ∫ p(θ) {5p(θ|x)
p(θ|x) −
5p(θ)
p(θ)
}2
dθ,
where the5 operates on the d dimensional θ. This is given by
F
{
p(·), p(·|x)} = ∫ p(θ) {5f(x; θ)
f(x; θ)
}2
dθ =
∫
p(θ)
d∑
j=1
{
∂
∂θj
log f(x; θ)
}2
dθ. (2)
Hence, with likelihood f(x; θ)w, we have Iw(x) = w2∆(x), where ∆(x) = F
{
p(·), p(·|x)}.
This leads to
w =
{∫
f(x; θ0) ∆(x) dx∫
f0(x) ∆(x) dx
}1
2
. (3)
This result also highlights why Fisher information is a convenient measure of information in the experi-
ment as it leads to an explicit formula for the setting of w.
The actual setting of w via (3) is hindered by the lack of knowledge of f0 and θ0. However, an
empirical approach follows trivially since we can estimate f0(x) with the empirical distribution function
of the data and then estimate θ0 with θ̂, the maximum likelihood estimator. Thus
ŵ =
{∫
f(x; θ̂) ∆(x) dx
n−1
∑n
i=1 ∆(Xi)
}1
2
.
A common simplifying choice of model would be from the class of exponential family;
f(x; θ) = exp

M∑
j=1
θj φj(x)− b(θ)

where the (φj(x)) are a set of basis functions and b(θ) is the normalizing constant. Then straightforward
calculations yield
w2 =
∫ ∫ ∑M
j=1{φj(x)− b′j(θ)}2 f(x; θ0) p(θ) dx dθ∫ ∫ ∑M
j=1{φj(x)− b′j(θ)}2 f0(x) p(θ) dx dθ
,
where θ0 is given by
∫
φj(x) f0(x) dx = b
′
j(θ0) for all j = 1, . . . ,M , and b
′
j(θ) = ∂b(θ)/∂θj . Hence
ŵ2 =
∫ ∫ ∑M
j=1{φj(x)− b′j(θ)}2 f(x; θ̂) p(θ) dx dθ
n−1
∑n
i=1
∫ ∑M
j=1{φj(xi)− b′j(θ)}2 p(θ) dθ
.
In general we have, under the usual assumptions on the model that θ̂ = θ0 + Op(n
−12 ), and that∫
∆2(x) f0(x) dx <∞:
Lemma 2.1. If f(x; θ0) = f0(x) then ŵ → 1 in probability as n→∞.
Proof. If we write γ(θ) =
∫
∆(x) f(x; θ) dx then we have γ(θ̂) = γ(θ0) + Op(n−
1
2 ). Also, γn =
n−1
∑n
i=1 ∆(xi) = γ(θ0) +Op(n
−12 ) and hence we have the result as ŵ2 = γ(θ̂)/γn. 
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3 Illustrations
We consider illustrations chosen to highlight the essential features of setting w, chosen when the model
is exponential family; specifically Poisson and normal.
3.1 Poisson model
If the model is Poisson, then for some θ > 0 the mass function for observation X = x is given by
f(x; θ) = θx/x! e−θ for x = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Then to find w we need to evaluate the denominator and
numerator in (3),
D =
∞∑
x=0
∆(x) f0(x) and N =
∞∑
x=0
∆(x) f(x; θ0)
where
∆(x) =
∫ ∞
0
{
∂f(x; θ)/∂θ
f(x; θ)
}2
p(θ) dθ =
∫ ∞
0
(x/θ − 1)2 p(θ) dθ,
θ0 maximizes
∑
x f0(x) log f(x; θ); and as f(x; θ) is Poisson we have θ0 = µ0 as the expected values
from f0, and σ20 the variance from f0. Hence, letting a =
∫
θ>0 θ
−2p(θ)dθ and b =
∫
θ>0 θ
−1p(θ)dθ, we
find, D = a(µ20 + σ
2
0)− 2bµ0 + 1 and N = (µ20 + µ0)a− 2bµ0 + 1. Then for the Poisson model fit
to data arising from f0(x) we have w2 = N/D and D = a(σ20 − µ0) +N .
On inspection of the result we see that when σ20 > µ0, where the data are “overdispersed”, we find
that w < 1. The idea here is that the data will provide larger than expected observations, from a Poisson
model perspective, and unless the observations are down weighted, then inference will appear overly
precise. Downweighting the information in the observations will provide a more stable and practical
inference for the unknown parameter. Equally when the data are underdispersed then the Bayesian
learning will be adjusted to w > 1 accounting for the increased precision in the data to learn about the
parameter θ0 minimising the relative entropy of the model to the data distribution.
To illustrate the performance we conducted the following experiment. We took n = 1000 obser-
vations from an overdispersed model, so X given φ is Poisson with mean φ and φ is from the gamma
distribution with mean 3.33 and variance 11.11. Thus the variance of the data is 14.44 while the mean
of the data is 3.33, so there is a substantial amount of overdispersion. The prior for θ in the Poisson
f(x; θ) model was taken to be gamma with mean 3 and variance 3. For this experiment we then com-
puted ŵ using the sample mean (x¯) and sample variance (S2); D̂ = a(x¯2 +S2)− 2bx¯+ 1 and N̂ =
a(x¯2 + x¯)− 2bx¯+ 1. Thus
ŵ2 =
a(x¯2 + x¯)− 2bx¯+ 1
a(x¯2 + S2)− 2bx¯+ 1 .
We plot the ŵ against sample size in Fig 1, and note that essentially the ŵ < 1, with convergence to a
number lower than 1.
On the other hand, if the model was true (the so called M -closed perspective in Bernardo & Smith
(2004)), then S2 − x¯ → 0, then ŵ2 → 1. Moreover, using standard asymptotic, large sample size n,
properties of models and estimators, we have that 1− ŵ2 → 0 at a speed of n−12 .
3.2 Exponential family
We provide some further analysis of the general case for the exponential family based on f(x; θ) =
c(x) exp{θx − b(θ)}. Then following the same strategy as in the previous sub-section, and using (3),
where now ∆(x) =
∫ {x− b′(θ)}2 p(θ) dθ and b′(θ0) = ∫ xf0(x) dx = ∫ xpθ0(x) dx, we can show
w2 =
b′′(θ0) +
∫ {
b′(θ0)− b′(θ)
}2
p(θ) dθ
σ20 +
∫ {
b′(θ0)− b′(θ)
}2
p(θ) dθ
4
which is estimated via
ŵ2 =
b′′(θ̂) +
∫ {
X¯ − b′(θ)}2p(θ) dθ
S2 +
∫ {
X¯ − b′(θ)}2p(θ) dθ .
Thus, w will converge to 1 or otherwise depending on how the sample variance S2 compares with the
variance estimator from the model; namely b′′(θ̂). Even in the case of regression models, the basic idea
is the same when ∆(·) is quadratic, as it would be for example in the case of a normal linear regression
model.
3.3 Normal model
Here we consider a normal model with unknown mean θ and variance 1. The prior for θ is normal with
mean 0 and precision parameter λ. The aim here is to compare our selection of w with an alternative
using the Kullback-Leibler divergence; i.e. to set w based on matching∫
D{pw(·|x), p(·)} dFn(x) =
∫
D{p(·|x), p(·)} f(x; θ̂) dx,
where D(q, p) =
∫
q log(q/p). Although there is no closed form solution for w here, we can evaluate it
numerically.
First we considered the overdispersed case and so generated 50 observations from a normal distri-
bution with precision 0.2 and use the prior for θ to have mean 0 and precision 0.01. Then we looked at
the underdispersed case and generated 50 observations from a normal distribution with precision 4 and
again use the prior for θ to have mean 0 and precision 0.01
In Fig 2, on the left side, we plot three posterior distributions: blue is the posterior using the w from
our Fisher information distance; red is the posterior using the w obtained from the Kullback-Leibler
divergence, and the green is the correct posterior had the model been used with the correct precision
parameter of 0.2.
On the right side of Fig 2 we again plot three posterior distributions: blue is the posterior using the
w from our Fisher information distance; red is the posterior using the w obtained from the Kullback-
Leibler divergence, and the green is the correct posterior had the model been used with the correct
precision parameter of 4. In both cases we see that our posterior is closer to the posterior based on the
correct model; i.e. replacing 1 with the precisions 0.2 and 4, respectively.
4 Discussion
It can be argued that all models are misspecified. Under such a scenario there is no formal connection
between any observed x and any θ when looking at f(x; θ) as a density function. On the other hand,
when viewed as a loss function, − log f(x; θ), and learning about θ0 = arg minθ∈Θ
∫
f(x; θ)f0(x) dx,
we can interpret the correspondence between x and the object of inference θ. However, as pointed out
in Bissiri, Holmes & Walker (2016), in this setting there is a free parameter w introduced by the model
misspecification. In this paper we have introduced principles for the specification of w which provides
an a priori coherent agenda in terms of prior expected gain in information about θ0.
Appendix: Motivation for Fisher information distance
As shown in Walker (2016), the expected (with respect to the prior predictive) Fisher information dis-
tance between prior and posterior is given by∫
p¯(x)F (p(·|x), p(·)) dx =
∫
J(θ) p(θ) dθ = E{J(Θ|X)} − J(Θ) (4)
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where J(θ) is the Fisher information for θ, p¯(x) is the prior predictive p¯(x) =
∫
f(x; θ)p(θ)dθ, and
J(Θ) =
∫
p′(θ)2/p(θ) dθ is known as the Fisher information for the density p(θ), while J(Θ|X) is
the Fisher information for the posterior given X . So it has similar properties to the Kullback-Leibler
divergence which relies on expected differential entropy between prior and posterior.
However, instead of using
F{p(·|x), p(·)} =
∫
p(θ|x)
{
∂
∂θ
log
p(θ|x)
p(θ)
}2
dθ
to get (4), we use
F{p(·), p(·|x)} =
∫
p(θ)
{
∂
∂θ
log
p(θ|x)
p(θ)
}2
dθ.
For the former is suited to the idealized setting of a correct model; whereas we are trying to evaluate the
prior and posterior discrepancy, i.e.{
p′(θ|x)
p(θ|x) −
p′(θ)
p(θ)
}2
=
{
∂
∂θ
log f(x; θ)
}2
= S2(x, θ),
where S(x, θ) is the usual score function, with respect to prior beliefs, for it is only the prior beliefs we
assume common to both experimenters; i.e. the one using I1 and the one using Iw.
We can elaborate further: the prior expected Fisher information; i.e. Ep(θ){J(θ)}, is∫
J(θ) p(θ) dθ =
∫
F{p(·|x), p(·)} p¯(x) dx =
∫ ∫
S2(x, θ) p(θ) f(x; θ) dθ dx.
This would be the expected information in a single sample as an expected discrepancy between prior
and posterior. However, this expected Fisher information is provided under the idealized setting that the
joint density of (x, θ) for the expectation of S2(x, θ) is p(θ) f(x; θ). It would be unrealistic for us to
assume the marginal density for x is p¯(x), even for the Bayesian assuming f(x; θ) is correct. A more
realistic estimation of the expected squared score function, i.e. information in a single sample, would be
to use the empirically determined joint density p(θ) f(x; θ̂).
For the Bayesian using f(x; θ)w, the score function is Sw(x, θ) = wS(x, θ), and so would estimate
the information, using the product measure of the prior and empirical distribution function, Fn(x), since
this Bayesian is assuming the model incorrect. Matching these two forms of information from a single
sample and about the same parameter, we have∫ ∫
S2w(x, θ) p(θ) dθ dFn(x) =
∫ ∫
S2(x, θ) p(θ) f(x, θ̂) dθ dx
where the term on the left is given byw2
∫ ∫
S2(x, θ) p(θ) dθ dFn(x) and recall that
∫
S2(x, θ)p(θ) dθ =
F{p(·), p(·|x)}. In short, we are using the square of the score function as a measure of information in a
single sample which also has the interpretation in terms of Fisher distance between prior and posterior.
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Figure 1: Plot of ŵ against sample size: Overdispersed case, Poisson example.
Figure 2: Posterior distributions in the overdispered case (left figure) and the underdispersed case (right
figure) for normal example: posterior based on Fisher distance w in blue; posterior based on Kullback-
Leibler w in red; and true posterior using the correct model from which data are generated in green.
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